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INTRODUCTION
Bid rigging is a form of procurement fraud that occurs when participants in a bidding process for public contracts
conspire to undermine the integrity or transparency of the process, sometimes with the complicity of public
officials. Common examples of violations include collusion among bidders to fix a common price, requests for
proposals deliberately and unnecessarily tailored so that only select bidders can meet their requirements, and
lowballed bids with hidden costs and fees.
In Japan, where corruption is generally perceived to be relatively rare, bid rigging—nyusatsu dango—is a persistent
and problematic form of public corruption. In many cases, bidders make secret agreements among themselves
about who will win and at which price. Other bidders will then deliberately submit losing bids. The colluding
bidders will then attempt to keep prices high, or rotate the allocation of winning bids among themselves,
undermining the neutral, independent, and competitive nature of the process. Such bid rigging deprives
government agencies and enterprises at all levels of taxpayer funds.
Of course, bid rigging is not just a problem in Japan alone. A 2014 survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found
procurement fraud to be the second-most common economic crime reported by companies worldwide.1 A 2008
study found that corrupt practices added 20-25% to the costs of public contracts in Europe.2 A 2013 estimate by
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) found a similar loss to corruption in
procurement contracts among member states. 3 A study of Japan’s legal and administrative reforms against bid
rigging over the last fifteen years may hold lessons for other jurisdictions struggling to curb this common form of
public corruption.

BID RIGGING IN JAPAN
The annual number of bid rigging cases subject to enforcement by
the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in Japan has varied
from 2 to 33 since the early 1990s (See Figure A). Bid rigging has
occurred in public construction contracts, as well as procurement Logo of the JFTC, Japan's watchdog against bid rigging.
contracts for goods and services. According to a manual on bid
rigging published by the Japan Fair Trade Commission in 2015 (the “JFTC Manual”),4 documented cases of bid
rigging in Japan include contracts for goods such as medical X-ray film and furniture for defense bases and services
ranging from construction consulting to aerial photography to water and soil analysis.5
Some cases of bid rigging by private firms are so carefully executed that public officers have trouble detecting the
collusion. In other cases, public officers responsible for oversight fail to detect collusion due to negligence or a lack
of training, time, or resources.
Some egregious cases have come to light in Japan in which public officers rigged bids at their own initiative.
Typically, such officers tipped bidders off about who would win in advance, intentionally leaked confidential
information that allowed select bidders to set prices that met government targets, or encouraged bidders to fix
prices or allocate orders. In Japan, bid rigging cases involving the complicity of public officers is known as kansei
dango, “government-involved bid rigging.”
A JFTC study found that high-ranking public officers (specifically, ranked at “manager class” or above) were
involved in almost all cases of government-involved bid rigging. Many cases involved former officers who had
retired at the time of misconduct.6 This may be related in part to a phenomenon called amakudari, or “parachuting.”
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Amakudari is a “Japanese term used to refer to the practice of government officials retiring into industries and
institutions, often those that they have formerly been involved in regulating.”7
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Source: JFTC Annual Reports, 1992-2014. (http://www.jftc.go.jp/soshiki/nenpou/).
*Measurement was not yet standardized and included price-fixing cartel cases. Given figures are conservative, lowest estimate. Number
of cases may be as high as 36 in 1992 and 33 in 1993.
**Prior to 2012, the statistics in the JFTC Annual Report seem not to have distinguished the number of cases of bid rigging for public
contracts from those for private contracts (See the JFTC Manual, at 1).

In some cases, government-involved bid rigging may involve an incumbent public officer trying to secure his own
future parachuting position by doing favors for a government bidder.8 Such an official may make orders to private
enterprises that employ former officials from his office, expecting to receive such a position in turn upon
retirement. The JFTC found cases in which such current and former officers colluded to tailor government orders
to favor construction companies that had allowed former officers to parachute into positions.9 For example, the
Tokyo District Court found that in one case an incumbent officer “gave preferred orders to a company which has a
track record of accepting former employees of his office, in exchange of securing these posts. We can regard this
case as a typical government-involved bid rigging closely tied with amakudari.”10
On the other hand, research by the JFTC found that public officers implicated in government-involved bid rigging
cases are not necessarily motivated by profit. Sometimes they wish to protect local businesses by securing them
stable, repeat orders. Sometimes, officers wish to steer orders towards private enterprises they know to have a
proven track record for performance, reliability, or high quality. Finally, some officers bend the rules just to keep
bidding processes proceeding smoothly.11
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JAPAN’S ANTITRUST LAW
The Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the “Antitrust Law”) governs
most forms of bid rigging, including government-involved bid rigging.12 The law holds that an “enterprise must not
effect private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade.” The latter term is defined in Article 2(6) as follows:
“Such business activities, by which any enterprise, by contract, agreement or any other means irrespective of
its name, in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a
manner as to fix, maintain or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or
counterparties, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any
particular field of trade.”

Therefore, private enterprises that commit bid rigging, with or without the knowing involvement of public officers,
violate the Antitrust Law.
Trade associations, associations of two or more private enterprises with the principal purpose of furthering their
common interests as enterprises (as defined in Article 2(2)), are also subject to the Antitrust Law, under Article 8(i).
Enterprises or trade associations that violate Article 3 or 8(i) of the Antitrust Law are subject to four types of
penalties: (1) Cease and Desist Order; (2) the payment of a surcharge calculated by multiplying a certain rate by the
amount of sales from relevant goods or services; (3) criminal punishment, with a maximum sentence of five years’
imprisonment or a fine of five million yen for an individual,13 or five hundred million yen for an enterprise14 or (4)
civil enforcement, after a cease and desist order becomes finally binding.15 In the latter case, the claim of damage is
subject to strict liability; governmental agencies have filed 11 civil damage cases from 2011-2015.16

JAPAN’S BID RIGGING ACT
In May 2000, a case of government-involved bid rigging in a construction contract in Hokkaido prefecture resulted
in a JFTC request that the Hokkaido government improve its internal governance to prevent future occurrences.
The disparity in treatment between offending private enterprises and offending public officers in the case provoked
outcry. Critics decried the lack of a legal mechanism to penalize or impose administrative measures on
governmental agencies involved in bid rigging.17
In response, the Parliament of Japan passed the “Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid
Rigging, etc. and Punishments for Acts by Employees that Harm Fairness of Bidding, etc.” (the “Bid Rigging Act”)
to make government agencies improve their internal governance to prevent recurrence of bid rigging.18 The Act
passed in July 2002 and became effective in January 2003.19
The original Bid Rigging Act was not successful in eliminating or preventing government-involved bid rigging, due
to two main factors. First, offending public officers were subject to relatively light criminal punishments. Second,
illegal acts under the Bid Rigging Act were defined too narrowly. An Amended Bid Rigging Act was passed in
December 2006 and became effective in March 2007. This amendment strengthened penalties and added new types
of covered illegal acts.20
As amended, the Bid Rigging Act prohibits two types of government involvement in bid rigging, each of which
results in a different enforcement action. First is “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.,” defined in Article 2(5) as
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“involvement in bid rigging, etc., by the employees of government or local governments, or directors or employees
of specified corporations (‘the employees’), and falling under any one of the following items:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Having an entrepreneur or trade association engage in bid rigging, etc.
Nomination of the counter party of a contract in advance, or indication or suggestion in
advance of wishes to the effect that a specified person be the counter party of the contract.
Out of various data concerning bidding or contract, indication or suggestion of information
held in confidential files to a specified entrepreneur or trade association, access to which
shall facilitate bid rigging etc. by the specified entrepreneur or trade association.
In connection with a specific bid rigging, etc., aiding bid rigging, etc. nominating a specific
person as participant to a bid, or by any other method, at the express or implicit request of
an entrepreneur, trade association, or any other entity or by voluntarily approaching these
persons, for the purpose of facilitating such bid rigging, etc., in breach of such employee's
duties.”

Notably, this list excludes potential forms of public officer’s involvement in bid rigging. The JFTC Manual raises
four examples falling under each type above:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

showing annual target amount of gross sales to each bidder and providing instructions to
coordinate to achieve these targets;
designating a bidder who should win a certain bid, or disclosing the name of a bidder who
desires to win to other bidders in advance of the bidding process;
leaking confidential target prices; and
approving an order table allowing bidders to take turns in winning bids, or to lower a
threshold of required specification of work for purpose of fostering bid rigging.21

The second type of involvement is described as “any acts that harm the fairness of such bidding, etc.” Article 8 of
the Bid Rigging Act lists examples including inciting any entrepreneur or person to conduct bid rigging or
informing any entrepreneur or person the target price or any other secret concerning such bidding processes. In
contrast to “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.,” Article 8 does not provide an exclusive list and covers other acts
that harm the fairness of such bidding processes and breach the duties of public officers.

PENALTIES UNDER THE BID RIGGING ACT
The Bid Rigging Act stipulates three types of enforcement for “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.” All types are
administrative or civil enforcement, rather than criminal penalties. 22 Even when a public officer violates the
provision, the decision about how to treat him as a disciplinary action is left to the government agency itself.
The first type of enforcement is for the JFTC to order the head of the offending government agency to implement
improvement measures, as stipulated in Article 3 of the Bid Rigging Act. The kind of specific measures to be
implemented is left to the offending government agency’s choice. The agency heads are required to “perform the
necessary investigation” to eliminate and prevent bid rigging problems. In a number of recent cases, the JFTC has
mandated improvement measures (See Figure B).
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Figure B: Examples of Government Reform Measures Undertaken in Response to JFTC Orders
Year
2003

Government Entity
City of Iwamizawa

Implemented Reforms





2004

City of Nigata










2005

Japan Highway Public
Corporation









2007

Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism








2010

Ministry of Defense



2011

Ibaraki Prefecture

Establish a Compliance Manual
Separate Business Departments from Contracting Departments
“Revolving Door” Prohibitions/Restrictions on former employees taking posts in associated
enterprises
Restrictions on private enterprises meeting with employees in procurement departments
Establish/Disseminate a Compliance Manual
Establish system for recording and disclosing any attempt by bidders to influence public
officers
Establish system for reporting improper conduct by public officials
Establish new department charged with compliance monitoring
Remove geographic/location-based restrictions in from bid qualifications
Restrict communication between public officers and private enterprises
Prohibit private enterprises from promoting sales to public employees
Implement stricter “Revolving Door” Prohibitions/Restrictions on former employees taking
posts in associated enterprises
Prohibit former employees from influencing current public servants
Implement stricter code of professional ethics
Hold regular seminars on compliance for public employees
Collect affidavits from public employees and directors promising to comply with relevant laws,
rules, and regulations
Establish a compliance committee and whistle-blower reporting system
Request private enterprises refrain from making sales promotions to public officers
Request retiring officers refrain from taking posts with associate enterprises









Establish and disseminate compliance manual
Hold regular seminars on compliance for public employees
Record any improper efforts to influence public officers and disclose specific agency response
Establish whistle-blower reporting system
Increase frequency of staff rotation
Request retiring officers refrain from taking posts with enterprises accused of, or found guilty
of, bid rigging
Request that any private enterprise accused of/found guilty of bid rigging refrain from hiring
former public employees
Abolish existing program to assist retiring public employees with finding new employment
Outsource procurement program
Modify existing guideline regarding drafting of specification requirements
Strengthen payment monitoring processes
Hold training sessions on compliance with “Bid Rigging Act”
Disseminate information regarding internal reporting system
Strengthen existing monitoring over suspicious bid results







Improve existing public employee ethics and compliance training
Disseminate information regarding internal reporting system
Review existing bid and contracts procedures
Establish standardized ethics policy
Reform personnel management

Source: The JFTC Manual at 40-42.
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The second enforcement tool is a “mandatory” damage claim by the government under Article 4(5). This provision
obligates the government to demand compensation if the internal investigation triggered by a JFTC order for
remedial reforms concludes that an offending public officer caused damages with willful or gross negligence.23
The third enforcement tool is to investigate and take disciplinary action against the offending officer. Such an
investigation is also triggered by a JFTC order for remedial reforms. The governmental agency has an obligation to
investigate under Article 5 of the Bid Rigging Act, and to disclose the investigation’s results. After an investigation,
the government has authority to decide whether to institute disciplinary actions.24 These actions may include an
admonition or reprimand, suspension, temporary pay cut, or other sanctions.25
In contrast to “Involvement in Bid Rigging etc.,” acts that harm the fairness of bidding are subject to criminal
sanctions, as determined by prosecutors and police, rather than the JFTC or government agency heads. 26 The
maximum criminal punishment is a prison term of five years or a fine not exceeding 2,500,000 yen, under Article 8
of the Bid Rigging Act.
In such cases, the prosecutors need not verify any violations of the Antitrust Law by private enterprises. Therefore,
it is possible that prosecutors start investigations ahead of the JFTC. In contrast, in cases of “Involvement in Bid
Rigging etc.,” the JFTC must verify violations of the Antitrust Law before demanding improvement measures
under Article 3 of the Bid Rigging Act.27 Criminal sanctions have been enforced in several cases in recent years,
often involving leaks of confidential government information to competing bidders for public contracts.28

COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST BID RIGGING IN JAPAN
Article 3(ii) and Article 3(iii) of the Act for Promoting Proper Tendering and Contracting for Public Works (“the
Promoting Properness Act”) stipulate that government offices must: promote fair competition in tenders and
contracts for public works and exclude improper procurement practices such as bid-rigging. Under Article 17 of the
Promoting Properness Act, the Cabinet of Japan established the Promoting Properness Guideline to describe
specific measures to achieve the law’s goals. The guideline specifically addresses the prevention of bid rigging.29
Under the Promoting Properness Guideline, the governmental agencies are expected to implement various
measures including:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

stop disclosing internal target prices which the governmental agency sets in advance of the bidding;
statistically analyze bidding results to detect possible evidence of bid rigging; and
adopt electronic bidding systems to reduce risks of collusion between competing bidders.30

Furthermore, to prevent government-involvement bid rigging, the guideline requires government offices to:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

improve accountability in the bidding and contracting processes;
educate officers about rules and regulations related to tenders and contracts for public works; and
strictly enforce rules against misconduct, in cooperation with the police and the JFTC.31

The guideline allows each agency to adopt its own measures to meet the guideline’s demands. In September 2011,
the JFTC disclosed the results of a survey of measures actually adopted by agencies (the “JFTC Report”), based on
questionnaires sent to 526 governmental entities and hearing inquiries into 33 governmental entities.32 The JFTC
points out that a substantial proportion of public officers might have lacked sufficient familiarity with the Bid
Rigging Act.33 After the JFTC held a seminar on the Bid Rigging Act for public officers, it surveyed attendees and
6

found that less than half of the attendees had known what the Bid Rigging Act covers.34 The JFTC recommended
that government agencies implement measures to improve their awareness of compliance rules.35

EDUCATION
The JFTC recommended three specific improvements. First, the government should provide officers with more
seminars, which are a good opportunity to announce and disseminate agency policies. According to the JFTC
Report, only one fourth of governmental agencies had held seminars within the previous three years. The JFTC
found that numerous officers responsible for public
procurement lacked knowledge of the Bid Rigging
More than 60% of small- or medium-sized
Act. 36 Moreover, the JFTC noted that managers
attended the seminars less frequently than low-level municipal agencies lacked compliance manuals,
staff. Since managerial officers are most likely to be and around 80% of agency compliance manuals
involved in bid rigging, the JFTC recommended that
failed to address the Bid Rigging Act.
they should be the main attendees of the seminars.37
Second, the JFTC suggested that each governmental
agency establish its own compliance manual. According to the JFTC Report, nearly half of governmental agencies
lacked compliance manuals. More than 60% of small or medium-sized municipal agencies lacked compliance
manuals, and around 80% of agency compliance manuals failed to address the Bid Rigging Act.38
Third, the JFTC suggested that each governmental agency clearly announce and disseminate its policy against
government-involved bid rigging. As stated above, many public officers involved in bid rigging do so for reasons of
perceived public interest, ranging from supporting local businesses to securing a smooth bidding process.
Understandably, such officers mistakenly believe such actions are legal and permissible. It is important for agencies
to clearly announce and disseminate policies against bid rigging to clear up such misunderstandings.39
Relatedly, the JFTC recommended that government agencies include bid rigging as a cause of internal disciplinary
action.40 The JFTC found in its research that only 23% of governmental agencies included bid rigging as an explicit
cause of disciplinary action.41

MONITORING AND REVIEW
By establishing a “double-checking phase” in which another department reviews procurement contracts authorized
by the department in charge of procurement, government agencies can more successfully prevent officers from
getting involved in bid rigging. It is effective to check the properness of a form of specification or bidder
qualification ex ante. According to the JFTC Report, 80% of governmental agencies had already isolated the
procurement department from the contracts department—the procurement department decides which enterprise
shall receive a procurement order, while the contracts department determines the contract terms and conditions.
However, 40% of government agencies allowed their procurement departments to review orders by themselves,
without permitting the contract departments to assist in the double-checking process. In such a situation, the
double-checker, as an insider, has comparatively little incentive to discover irregularities. Thus, the JFTC suggested
that governmental agencies allow outsider departments, such as contract departments, to double-check the
properness of orders.42
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To maximize effective oversight, the JFTC recommended that government offices institute measures for ex-post
review of procurement bids, in addition to ex-ante review. The ex-post double-checking system examines the result of
the bidding process for unreasonable or unnatural patterns. For example, if only one enterprise continues to receive
orders for a long term, it may be evidence of misconduct by the procurement officer. Likewise, a case in which the
price of the winning bid is identical to an internal target price prepared in advance of the bidding may indicate a
leak of confidential information. By analyzing such unnatural patterns for evidence of bid rigging, government
offices increase the chance of discovering and preventing government-involved bid rigging. According to the JFTC
Report, 60-80% of government agencies had not adopted such ex-post double-checking measures, and thus were
unaware of suspicious bidding results.43

WHISTLE-BLOWER REPORTING SYSTEM
More than 80% of the government agencies surveyed had built internal whistle-blower reporting systems, while
only 30% of them had made officers aware that this reporting system covered information related to governmentinvolved bid rigging. The JFTC noted that government agencies needed to make officers aware that whistle-blowers
are protected under their internal reporting system when reporting evidence of government-involved bid rigging.44
The JFTC found some cases in which an offending officer got involved in bid rigging in response to a request made
by a private enterprise, the prospective bidder. It is almost impossible to completely eliminate situations in which
prospective bidders possibly try to improperly influence public officers in the procurement process, since such
officers communicate with private enterprises on a daily basis.45
However, public officers may be expected to report such attempts at improper influence. The JFTC suggested that
the governmental agencies build a reporting system for officers to make written reports to their supervisors when a
prospective bidder requests a public officer to leak confidential information or to provide another favor. The JFTC
Report found that only 30% of the governmental agencies had adopted such reporting system, but that interviews
suggested that such reporting systems decreased attempts by the private sector to influence public officers. Thus,
the JFTC found the reporting system to be an effective deterrent.46

STAFF ROTATION AND REORGANIZATION
The JFTC suggested that government agencies rotate employees, so they are not allowed to stay in the same
position long enough to develop personal relationships with private bidders and conceal involvement in bid rigging.
According to the JFTC Report, around 70% of governmental agencies had already engaged in such short-interval
rearrangement of human resources. The JFTC expects and recommends that other government agencies adopt this
measure.47

REGULATION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
The JFTC Report found that government offices have to be alerted to corruption risks posed by former public
employees who may become implicated in government-involved bid rigging. According to the JFTC Report, some
government agencies requested that private enterprises that hired former employees refrain from having the former
employee handle procurement deals in connection with the former employee’s duty while in government service.
Some government agencies held seminars for former employees to learn compliance with the Bid-Rigging Act.48
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CONCLUSION
Since the turn of the century, Japan has made great strides in cracking down on bid rigging, through the Bid Rigging
Act and its amendments, the efforts of the JFTC, and counter-measures and training efforts instituted by
government agencies. Cases of bid rigging have been on the decline since the Bid Rigging Act became effective in
2003.
However, as the JFTC found, government agencies still have far to go in implementing reforms to stamp out bidrigging. Successful counter-measures include training seminars, revised compliance manuals, clear announcement of
policy, ex-ante and ex-post contract review mechanisms, whistle-blower systems, rotation of procurement staff, and
rules discouraging “parachuting” employment relationships between procurement offices and private-sector firms
that give such firms an unfair advantage in the procurement process. Other countries and jurisdictions seeking to
combat bid rigging may wish to consider relevant Japanese laws and counter-measures as a potential model in the
struggle against corruption in public procurement.
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